Bandol, ses rouges impressionnent

Commençons par la plus vaste : Bandol. L’appellation est composée de 1 580 hectares protégés au nord par le massif de la Sainte-Baume, ouverts vers la mer au sud. Un relief magnifique où la vigne partage les collines, les restanques – ces terrasses construites par l’homme pour dompter les coteaux – avec les oliviers, les pinèdes et les maisons individuelles omniprésentes sur des sols plus ou moins forts en argiles et calcaires. Dans les années 1930, une poignée de visionnaires, dont la comtesse Arlette Portalis au château Pradeaux, Lucien Peyraud au domaine Tempier et le docteur André Roethlisberger, un Suisse propriétaire du château Milhière (qui ne produit plus de vins aujourd’hui), s’unit pour créer l’AOC Bandol, avec le mourvèdre, cépage venu d’Espagne sous le nom de monastrell, comme pierre angulaire des vins, épaulé par le grenache, la syrah, le cinsault et le carignan.

En ce moment :

Ici, les rouges sont solaires, denses, parfois trop corpulents, pourvus de notes giboyeuses après une trentaine d’années, moins charmeurs que la syrah de la Vallée du Rhône ou le pinot noir de Bourgogne. Pour autant, pas question de travestir les vins ; au contraire, les vignerons cultivent leur identité méditerranéenne.

Impénétrable mourvèdre

Les plus belles cuvées n’ont jamais autant revendiqué le mourvèdre dans les assemblages. Il compte jusqu’à 95 % pour la Cuvée Collection du château Sainte Anne ! Une part d’autant plus élevée que ce cépage encaisse mieux les changements climatiques que son compagnon le grenache, dont les degrés alcooliques s’envolent avec le réchauffement des températures.

Le mourvèdre confère aux rouges de Bandol une identité à part. En dégustation, il faut les laisser venir. Ils ne séduisent pas tout de suite. La réduction peut leur donner une allure un peu sauvage. Après une aération de quelques heures, les notes épicées et de fruits noirs arrivent. Avec le temps, ils se complexifient (garrigue, thym et tapenade d’olive noire), tout en conservant un caractère impénétrable. Ce n’est pas de l’austérité, mais de la réserve. On s’éloigne de l’expression fruitée vers quelque chose de plus organique et minéral. En bouche, on retrouve ce caractère rocailleux, d’une densité incroyable, une force du cépage que le terroir et la main de l’homme transmutent magnifiquement en finesse.

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Provence : quel millésime privilégier entre 2018, 2019 et 2020 ?
La Provence, le nouvel eldorado viticole des milliardaires !

Des décennies de garde

L’âme de Bandol se retrouve aussi bien dans un style puissant et saillant, à l’image des vins du domaine Lafran-Veyrolles ou de La Bastide Blanche, que dans une tonalité plus stylisée et suave, à l’instar de ceux des domaines Tempier, Terrebrune et du château de Pibarnon. Pour découvrir un caractère plus libre, goûtez aux vins du château Sainte Anne et de Castell-Reynoard. La nouvelle génération à Baravéou et aux Œuvres Vives livre, quant à elle, une expression plus sensuelle de l’appellation. Le potentiel de garde des rouges de Bandol ? Des décennies. Le 1998 de Terrebrune, le 1996 de Ray-Jane, le 1990 de Pibarnon, La Louffe 1988 de Tempier, le 1961 de Pradeaux sont d’une beauté inouïe.

Vous l’avez compris, Bandol est un terroir fabuleux pour les rouges. Cependant, succès du rosé oblige, l’appellation se plie à la demande et lui consacre aujourd’hui 75 % de ses volumes. Pour marquer leur différence avec les rosés provençaux fluets et exubérants, certains vignerons cisèlent des cuvées (presque) exclusivement avec le mourvèdre. Des rosés souvent bien meilleurs après un an lorsqu’ils quittent leur aromatique extravagante de pomelo pour trouver celle de la nuance épicée et du zeste. On recense différents styles, certains dans la puissance vineuse (La Bégude, Pradeaux, La Suffrène), d’autres davantage sur la finesse (Terrebrune, Lafran-Veyrolles). Enfin, une part infime de blancs est à découvrir (4 %) ; La Bastide Blanche et le château Sainte Anne en premier lieu.

Cassis, des blancs toniques

Partons maintenant à Cassis. Cette appellation resplendissante cernée par les calanques et le majestueux cap Canaille produisait historiquement du rouge et un muscat liquoreux. Mais c’est pour son blanc que Cassis s’est fait connaître. À la fin du XVIIIe siècle, on parlait même d’“oyster wine” (littéralement : vin d’huître) pour définir ce blanc très sec. Au début du XXe siècle, circulaient sur le marché des bouteilles étiquetées “Vin de Cassis” bien plus que la petite appellation maritime pouvait en produire. Des vins venus d’Algérie étaient même vendus à Marseille sous le label cassidain. Tout cela a fortement incité des personnalités de l’époque, dont le baron Le Roy de Boiseaumarié, le père des AOC françaises, à initier les premières appellations d’origine contrôlée. Les toutes premières furent Châteauneuf-du-Pape, Arbois, Monbazillac, Tavel et… Cassis, en 1936.

Aujourd’hui, douze domaines se partagent les 210 hectares de ce ravissant vignoble. Les blancs à dominante de clairette et marsanne y sont friands, croquants, d’une légèreté plus septentrionale que méditerranéenne. Ils restent le fer de lance de Cassis. Leur modèle commercial est simple : ils sont pour la plupart mis en bouteilles au printemps, vendus et bus l’été suivant. Bien souvent, ce sont des compagnons rafraîchissants. Avec la proximité de la mer, on leur attribue même une certaine “salinité”. Nous y voyons plutôt un caractère acidulé dû à un manque de maturité des raisins.

Soyons honnêtes, nous attendons plus d’ambition, d’étoffe, de complexité et de profondeur de ces vins nés dans un cadre aussi idyllique. Heureusement, certains domaines recherchent des blancs plus aboutis et parés pour quelques années de garde : la cuvée Marquis de Fesques du domaine du Bagnol, Cuvée Kalahari du Clos Val Bruyère et Bel-Arme du Clos Sainte Magdeleine. Terminons avec ce ressenti étonnant : le plus beau vin de Cassis que nous avons dégusté est… rouge. C’est le 2019 du domaine du Bagnol. À dominante de mourvèdre, il remet en perspective la production de rouges du vignoble cassidain. Affaire à suivre.

Conditions de la dégustation
Les vins ont été dégustés par Alexis Goujard en avril 2022 dans les syndicats de Cassis et Bandol. 

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States and its allies could pursue across economic, political, and military areas to stress—overextend and unbalance—Russia’s economy and armed forces and the regime's political standing at home and abroad. Some of the options examined are clearly more promising than others, but any would need to be evaluated in terms of the overall U.S. strategy for dealing with Russia, which neither the report nor this brief has attempted to do.

The maxim that “Russia is never so strong nor so weak as it appears” remains as true in the current century as it was in the 19th and 20th.

Today’s Russia suffers from many vulnerabilities—oil and gas prices well below peak that have caused a drop in living standards, economic sanctions that have furthered that decline, an aging and soon-to-be-declining population, and increasing authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin’s now-continued rule. Such vulnerabilities are coupled with deep-seated (if exaggerated) anxieties about the possibility of Western-inspired regime change, loss of great power status, and even military attack.

Despite these vulnerabilities and anxieties, Russia remains a powerful country that still manages to be a U.S. peer competitor in a few key domains. Recognizing that some level of competition with Russia is inevitable, RAND researchers conducted a qualitative assessment of “cost-imposing options” that could unbalance and overextend Russia. Such cost-imposing options could place new burdens on Russia, ideally heavier burdens than would be imposed on the United States for pursuing those options.

The work builds on the concept of long-term strategic competition developed during the Cold War, some of which originated at RAND. A seminal 1972 RAND report posited that the United States needed to shift its strategic thinking away from trying to stay ahead of the Soviet Union in all dimensions and toward trying to control the competition and channel it into areas of U.S. advantage. If this shift could be made successfully, the report concluded, the United States could prompt the Soviet Union to shift its limited resources into areas that posed less of a threat.

The new report applies this concept to today’s Russia. A team of RAND experts developed economic, geopolitical, ideological, informational, and military options and qualitatively assessed them in terms of their likelihood of success in extending Russia, their benefits, and their risks and costs.

Economic Cost-Imposing Measures
Expanding U.S. energy production would stress Russia’s economy, potentially constraining its government budget and, by extension, its defense spending. By adopting policies that expand world supply and depress global prices, the United States can limit Russian revenue. Doing so entails little cost or risk, produces second-order benefits for the U.S. economy, and does not need multilateral endorsement.

Figure 1. Russian Petroleum Exports Are Declining

Year Percentage of the total value of exports
2012 ~70
2013 ~70
2014 ~68
2015 63
2016 47
SOURCE: United Nations (UN), UN Comtrade Database, electronic online database, 2017.

Imposing deeper trade and financial sanctions would also likely degrade the Russian economy, especially if such sanctions are comprehensive and multilateral. Thus, their effectiveness will depend on the willingness of other countries to join in such a process. But sanctions come with costs and, depending on their severity, considerable risks.

Increasing Europe’s ability to import gas from suppliers other than Russia could economically extend Russia and buffer Europe against Russian energy coercion. Europe is slowly moving in this direction by building regasification plants for liquefied natural gas (LNG). But to be truly effective, this option would need global LNG markets to become more flexible than they already are and would need LNG to become more price-competitive with Russian gas.

Encouraging the emigration from Russia of skilled labor and well-educated youth has few costs or risks and could help the United States and other receiving countries and hurt Russia, but any effects—both positive for receiving countries and negative for Russia—would be difficult to notice except over a very long period. This option also has a low likelihood of extending Russia.

NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.

Geopolitical Cost-Imposing Measures
Photo by Sgt. Mitchell Ryan/DoD
Syrian Democratic Forces trainees, representing an equal number of Arab and Kurdish volunteers, stand in formation at their graduation ceremony in northern Syria, August 9, 2017.

Photo by Sgt. Mitchell Ryan/DoD

Providing lethal aid to Ukraine would exploit Russia’s greatest point of external vulnerability. But any increase in U.S. military arms and advice to Ukraine would need to be carefully calibrated to increase the costs to Russia of sustaining its existing commitment without provoking a much wider conflict in which Russia, by reason of proximity, would have significant advantages.

Increasing support to the Syrian rebels could jeopardize other U.S. policy priorities, such as combating radical Islamic terrorism, and could risk further destabilizing the entire region. Furthermore, this option might not even be feasible, given the radicalization, fragmentation, and decline of the Syrian opposition.

Promoting liberalization in Belarus likely would not succeed and could provoke a strong Russian response, one that would result in a general deterioration of the security environment in Europe and a setback for U.S. policy.

Expanding ties in the South Caucasus—competing economically with Russia—would be difficult because of geography and history.

Reducing Russian influence in Central Asia would be very difficult and could prove costly. Increased engagement is unlikely to extend Russia much economically and likely to be disproportionately costly for the United States.

Flip Transnistria and expel the Russian troops from the region would be a blow to Russian prestige, but it would also save Moscow money and quite possibly impose additional costs on the United States and its allies.

NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.

Ideological and Informational Cost-Imposing Measures
Photo by Dmitry Vereshchagin/Adobe Stock
Muscovites protesting the war in Ukraine and Russia’s support of separatism in the Crimea on the Circular Boulevards in Moscow on March 15, 2014.

Photo by Dmitry Vereshchagin/Adobe Stock

Diminishing faith in the Russian electoral system would be difficult because of state control over most media sources. Doing so could increase discontent with the regime, but there are serious risks that the Kremlin could increase repression or lash out and pursue a diversionary conflict abroad that might run counter to Western interests.

Creating the perception that the regime is not pursuing the public interest could focus on widespread, large-scale corruption and further challenge the legitimacy of the state. But it is hard to assess whether political volatility and protests would lead to a more extended Russia—less able or inclined to threaten Western interests abroad—or to a Russia more inclined to lash out in retaliation or to distract, making this a high-risk option.

Encouraging domestic protests and other nonviolent resistance would focus on distracting or destabilizing the Russian regime and reducing the likelihood that it would pursue aggressive actions abroad, but the risks are high and it would be difficult for Western governments to directly increase the incidence or intensity of anti-regime activities in Russia.

Undermining Russia’s image abroad would focus on diminishing Russian standing and influence, thus undercutting regime claims of restoring Russia to its former glory. Further sanctions, the removal of Russia from non-UN international forums, and boycotting such events as the World Cup could be implemented by Western states and would damage Russian prestige. But the extent to which these steps would damage Russian domestic stability is uncertain.

While none of these measures has a high probability of success, any or all of them would prey on the Russian regime’s deepest anxieties and might be employed as a deterrent threat to diminish Russia’s active disinformation and subversion campaigns abroad.

NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.

Air and Space Cost-Imposing Measures
Sailors
Marines assigned to the Thunderbolts of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 251 remove a training AGM-88 HARM from an F/A-18C Hornet on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71).

Photo by Anthony N. Hilkowski/DVIDS

Reposturing bombers within easy striking range of key Russian strategic targets has a high likelihood of success and would certainly get Moscow’s attention and raise Russian anxieties; the costs and risks of this option are low as long as the bombers are based out of range of most of Russia’s theater ballistic and ground-based cruise missiles.

Reposturing fighters so that they are closer to their targets than bombers as a way to achieve higher sortie rates to compensate for their smaller payloads would likely concern Moscow even more than reposturing bombers, but the likelihood of success is low and risks are high. Because each aircraft would need to fly multiple sorties during a conventional conflict, Russian leaders would probably be confident that they could destroy many fighters on the ground and shut down their deployment airfields early on with few or no additions to their missile inventory.

Deploying additional tactical nuclear weapons to locations in Europe and Asia could heighten Russia’s anxiety enough to significantly increase investments in its air defenses. In conjunction with the bomber option, it has a high likelihood of success, but deploying more such weapons might lead Moscow to react in ways contrary to U.S. and allied interests.

Repositioning U.S. and allied ballistic missile defense systems to better engage Russian ballistic missiles would also alarm Moscow but would likely be the least effective option because Russia could easily saturate current systems and any planned upgrades with a small percentage of its existing missile inventory, leaving many missiles still available to hold U.S. and allied targets at risk.

There are also ways to get Russia to extend itself in strategic competition. In terms of benefits, such developments would exploit Moscow’s demonstrated fear of U.S. airpower capabilities and doctrines. Developing new low-observable, long-range bombers, or simply adding significantly more of types that are already available or programmed (B-2s and B-21s) would be worrisome for Moscow, as would developing autonomous or remotely piloted strike aircraft and producing them in high numbers. All options would likely incentivize Moscow to devote ever-greater resources to making its command and control systems harder, more mobile, and more redundant.

A key risk of these options is being drawn into arms races that result in cost-imposing strategies directed against the United States. For example, investing in ballistic missile defense systems and space-based weapons would alarm Moscow, but Russia could defend against such developments by taking measures that would probably be considerably cheaper than the costs of these systems to the United States.

As for likelihood of success, some options are good cost-imposing strategies, but some—such as investing more in HARMs or other electronic warfare technologies—are clearly better than others, and some approaches should be avoided, such as those that focus on space-based weapons or ballistic missile defense systems.

The United States might goad Russia into a costly arms race by breaking out of the nuclear arms control regime, but the benefits are unlikely to outweigh U.S. costs. The financial costs of a nuclear arms race would probably be as high for the United States as they would be for Russia, perhaps higher. But the more serious costs would be political and strategic.

control regime Low Moderate High
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.

Maritime Cost-Imposing Measures
USN
A U.S. sailor aboard the guided missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89) fires a torpedo at a simulated target during Valiant Shield 2014 in the Pacific Ocean September 18, 2014.

Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Declan Barnes/DVIDS

Increasing U.S. and allied naval force posture and presence in Russia’s operating areas could force Russia to increase its naval investments, diverting investments from potentially more dangerous areas. But the size of investment required to reconstitute a true blue-water naval capability makes it unlikely that Russia could be compelled or enticed to do so.

Increasing naval R&D efforts would focus on developing new weapons that allow U.S. submarines to threaten a broader set of targets or enhance their ability to threaten Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which could impose anti-submarine warfare costs on Russia. There are limited risks, but success depends on being able to develop these capabilities and on whether they are sufficiently capable of influencing Russian expenditures.

Shifting nuclear posture toward SSBNs would entail increasing the percentage of the U.S. nuclear triad assigned to SSBNs by increasing the size of that fleet. While it might force Russia to invest in capabilities that can operate in a blue-water environment in two oceans and would reduce risks to U.S. strategic posture, the option is unlikely to entice Russia into changing its strategy and, thus, extending itself.

Checking the Black Sea buildup would involve deploying strengthened North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) anti-access and area denial over the Black Sea—perhaps in the form of long-range, land-based anti-ship missiles—to drive up the cost of defending Russian bases in Crimea and lower the benefit to Russia of having seized this area. Russia would certainly mount a vigorous diplomatic and informational campaign to dissuade coastal NATO and non-NATO states from participating. Also, operating in the Black Sea is politically and logistically more difficult for the U.S. Navy than the Russian Navy; it is also more dangerous for the former in a conflict.

NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.

Land and Multidomain Cost-Imposing Measures
#ArtemisStrike
Exercise Artemis Strike was a German-led tactical live-fire exercise with live Patriot and Stinger missiles at the NATO Missile Firing Installation in Chania, Greece, from October 31 to November 9, 2017. More than 200 U.S. soldiers and approximately 650 German airmen participated in the realistic training within a combined construct, exercising the rigors associated with force projection and educating operators on their air missile defense systems.

Photo by Anthony Sweeney/DVIDS

Increasing U.S. forces in Europe, increasing European NATO member ground capabilities, and deploying a large number of NATO forces on the Russian border would likely have only limited effects on extending Russia. All the options would enhance deterrence, but the risks vary. A general increase in NATO ground force capabilities in Europe—including closing European NATO member readiness gaps and increasing the number of U.S. forces stationed in traditional locations in Western Europe—would have limited risks. But large-scale deployments on Russia’s borders would increase the risk of conflict with Russia, particularly if perceived as challenging Russia’s position in eastern Ukraine, Belarus, or the Caucasus.

Increasing the size and frequency of NATO exercises in Europe may help to enhance readiness and deterrence, but it is unlikely to prompt a costly Russian response unless the exercises also send risky signals. Large-scale NATO exercises held near Russia’s borders and exercises that practice counterattack or offensive scenarios could be perceived as showing the intent and willingness to consider offensive operations. For example, a NATO exercise simulating a counterattack to retake NATO territory lost to advancing Russian forces might look like an exercise to prepare for an invasion of a piece of Russian territory, such as Kaliningrad.

Developing but not deploying an intermediate-range missile could bring Russia back into conformity with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty but could also prompt an acceleration of Russian missile programs. Withdrawing from that treaty and building the missiles but not deploying them in Europe would add little to U.S. capabilities and would probably prompt Russia to deploy such missiles itself—and, perhaps, invest more in ballistic missile defense. Taking the further step of deploying the missiles to Europe, assuming that NATO allies were willing, would also almost certainly prompt a Russian response, potentially involving substantial resources, or at least the diversion of substantial resources from other defense spending, though it is hard to assess what share would be directed toward defensive capabilities versus offensive or retaliatory ones.

Incremental investments in new technologies to counter Russian air defenses and increase U.S. long-range fires could significantly improve defense and deterrence while compelling increased Russian investment in countermeasures. Investments in more-revolutionary, next-generation technologies could have even greater effects, given the Russian concerns about new physical principles, but depending on the capability, such investments could also risk strategic stability by threatening the Russian regime and leadership security in a crisis.

NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.

Implications for the Army
The task of “extending Russia” need not fall primarily on the Army or even the U.S. armed forces as a whole. Indeed, the most promising ways to extend Russia—those with the highest benefit, the lowest risk, and greatest likelihood of success—likely fall outside the military domain. Russia is not seeking military parity with the United States and, thus, might simply choose not to respond to some U.S. military actions (e.g., shifts in naval presence); other U.S. military actions (e.g., posturing forces closer to Russia) could ultimately prove more costly to the United States than to Russia. Still, our findings have at least three major implications for the Army.

The U.S. Army should rebuild its linguistic and analytical expertise on Russia. Because Russia does pose a long-term threat, the Army needs to develop the human capital to engage in this strategic competition.
The Army should consider investing and encouraging the other services to invest more in capabilities, such as Army Tactical Missile Systems, Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 2, longer-range anti-air defense, and other systems designed to counter Russian anti-access and area denial capabilities. The Army also might consider spending some R&D resources on less-mature, more-futuristic systems (e.g., swarm unmanned aerial vehicles or remote combat vehicles). While these measures would likely be insufficient in themselves to greatly extend Russia, they would benefit U.S. deterrence efforts and could augment a broader whole-of-government policy.
Even if the Army were not directly involved in extending Russia per se, it would play a key role in mitigating the possible blowback. All the options to extend Russia incur some risk. As a result, enhancing U.S. deterrence posture in Europe and increasing U.S. military capabilities (e.g., an enhanced Javelin or active protection systems for Army vehicles) might need to go hand in hand with any move to extend Russia, as a way of hedging against the chance of tensions with Russia escalating into conflict.
Conclusions
The most-promising options to “extend Russia” are those that directly address its vulnerabilities, anxieties, and strengths, exploiting areas of weakness while undermining Russia’s current advantages. In that regard, Russia’s greatest vulnerability, in any competition with the United States, is its economy, which is comparatively small and highly dependent on energy exports. Russian leadership’s greatest anxiety stems from the stability and durability of the regime, and Russia’s greatest strengths are in the military and info-war realms. The table below draws from the earlier tables to identify the most-promising options.

Most of the options discussed, including those listed here, are in some sense escalatory, and most would likely prompt some Russian counterescalation. Thus, besides the specific risks associated with each option, there is additional risk attached to a generally intensified competition with a nuclear-armed adversary to consider. This means that every option must be deliberately planned and carefully calibrated to achieve the desired effect. Finally, although Russia will bear the cost of this increased competition less easily than the United States will, both sides will have to divert national resources from other purposes. Extending Russia for its own sake is not a sufficient basis in most cases to consider the options discussed here. Rather, the options must be considered in the broader context of national policy based on defense, deterrence, and—where U.S. and Russian interests align—cooperation.

NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.